Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?
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Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?

(This article was first published by the Lowy Interpreter)

The US Treasury’s ‘designation’ of Lt-Gen Thein Htay, Chief of Burma’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI), for purchasing military goods from North Korea, surprised many. After Barack Obama’s visit to Burma in November 2012, when he was assured by President Thein Sein that such activities would cease, concerns about Naypyidaw’s shadowy relationship with Pyongyang had seemed to fade.

In March, some suspect dual use materials from North Korea were seized by Japan, but nothing seemed to come of it. And North Korea did not rate a mention in the official statements and learned commentary related to President Thein Sein’s return visit to Washington in May. The State Department Fact Sheet issued after the visit was all good news.

Yet US concerns about Burma’s military links with North Korea have never gone away.

Before Obama’s visit to Burma, Naypyidaw’s relationship with Pyongyang was the subject of considerable concern. Washington tended to discount a clandestine nuclear weapons program but remained worried about the possible sale to Burma of ballistic missiles and/or missile production facilities. In April 2012, a senior State Department official told Congress that this was ‘a top national security priority’.

During the Obama visit the Burmese Government announced that it would cut its military ties with North Korea. It stated that it had not and would not violate UN Security Council resolutions 1874 of 2009 and 1718 of 2006, both of which banned arms sales from North Korea. Burma also reiterated its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a claim that has since been accepted by Washington.

Following the Obama visit, and assurances from several Burmese officials that links with North Korea had indeed been severed, the issue dropped from sight. There were warnings from a few critics of the US rapprochement with Burma, but it was almost as if the matter had been resolved. A survey of official US statements over the past year, however, suggests that Burma’s relationship with North Korea has continued to weigh on Washington’s mind:

On 11 July 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order stating that Burma’s arms trade with North Korea constituted ‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’. It authorized sanctions against Burmese individuals and institutions engaged in this practice.

On the basis of this Order, the US formally ‘designated’ Burma’s DDI which, according to the State Department, ‘carries out missile research and development at its facilities in Burma, where North Korean experts are active’.

In February 2013, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, W Patrick Murphy, told the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission that the US continued to target those who ‘perpetuate military trade with North Korea’.

Speaking to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on 25 April 2013, a State Department official revealed that the US continued to ask the Burmese Government to demonstrate ‘an end of military ties to North Korea’.

On 2 May 2013, in a briefing about the relaxation of economic sanctions against Burma, State Department officials stated that ‘specific bad actors’ in Burma engaging in trade with North Korea would not be eligible to enter the US.

Looking back over these statements, it would appear that the US has tried to keep up public pressure on Naypyidaw — as it has doubtless been doing in private — but it has not allowed its concerns over continuing Burmese links with North Korea to interrupt the development of bilateral relations. This represents a softening in the US position since Hillary Clinton’s December 2011 visit to Burma.

This policy shift may account for the fact that sanctions have been imposed on a single department of Burma’s armed forces and an individual army officer. The recent Treasury document specifically states that it is not targeting the Burmese Government, which ‘has continued to take positive steps in severing its military ties with North Korea’. It also refers to Naypyidaw’s undertaking in 2012 to abide by the relevant UNSC resolutions.

That formulation may satisfy diplomatic etiquette, but it is difficult to see how LTGEN Thein Htay or the DDI could maintain links with a foreign power without the knowledge of the armed forces leadership, and probably the president. It is also unlikely that DDI’s acquisitions from North Korea have not been in formal breach of UNSC resolutions 1874 and 1718. If the transactions were benign, why the strong US response?

As Network Myanmar’s Derek Tonkin has pointed out, the Treasury statement did not say when the offences took place, or what arms were involved. However, a US spokesman has revealed that the Treasury Department has had concerns about Thein Htay since last November, when he led a Burmese delegation to Beijing. There he met North Korean officials and signed an agreement to expand bilateral military ties.

Senator Richard Lugar is no longer around to voice his perennial concerns about secret deals between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw, but Congress has already sounded some warning bells. North Korea was not specifically mentioned, but in June both houses called for greater transparency from the Burmeseabout military budgets and operations before the US seeks closer engagement with their armed forces.

The Burmese Government has expressed surprise at the recent Treasury announcement, and President Thein Sein’s office has claimed not to know the evidence on which the latest US sanctions are based. Only last month, the Speaker of Burma’s lower house of parliament reportedly told officials in Washington that Burma’s arms trade with North Korea had ceased, and that Naypyidaw was observing the relevant UNSC resolutions.

The latest developments in this saga raise a number of difficult questions. Is LTGEN Thein Htay a maverick, acting alone? Are Burma’s armed forces beyond the president’s control? Is Naypyidaw trying to squeeze in a few more arms sales and wrap up a secret missile program before cutting its ties with Pyongyang? Is Thein Sein hoping that the US wish to preserve its good relations with Burma will persuade it to turn a blind eye?

Once again, observers are left bemoaning the lack of hard information, not only about Burma’s shadowy relationship with North Korea, but also what drives the decisions of policy makers in Naypyidaw and Pyongyang — and Washington.

Andrew Selth is a research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute. This article first appeared in the Lowy Interpreter on July 10, 2013.


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6 Responses to Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?

  1. It is preposterous, hypocritical and condescending for the U.S. to be whining and complaining about Myanmar dealing with the DPRK. It is a sovereign nation with every right to deal with any nation on this planet. Myanmar is not a “client state or lackey of the U.S.” like Japan, S. Korea, Egypt, etc. This attitude and arrogance of the U.S. is the clear evidence released by Americans of conscience like Snowden telling the rest of the world the U.S Government speaks from both sides of the mouth. It spies on every one including its own citizens, other Governments and its leaders, and other citizens’ phone calls, emails etc. It behaves in the world like “an out of control high school student” and no country takes it seriously today.

    The U.S. instead of taking care of its own affairs like providing affordable health care to more than 50 million of its citizens, jobs for nearly 22 million unemployed and under employed, goes around letting other sovereign countries like Myanmar “what country to deal with and what country not to deal with is totally out of line and unacceptable behavior. The Government and people of Myanmar out of “courtesy and politeness” may not respond in like manner, but as a sovereign nation such continued attitude on the part of the U.S. will have serious consequences in its bilateral relations and set back the “positive progress made thus far”.

    Naphetchun MaungSein

    California, USA

    • If we accept first of all that North Korea is an aggressive and totalitarian regime prone to act irrationally and dangerously due to internal conflicts and the arrangement of ruling power, then the question is: what should be done? The US has decided that rather than using military force against the bellicose threats of North Korea (and the immense loss of life both in South Korea and especially to the common people in North Korea that millitary force would entail) that instead it would use economic force to constrain them.

      That is, in my mind the more humane approach. But to work it requires not just the exercise of US economic power, but also the cooperation of other countries too. The US has worked diligently to make sanctions against North Korea binding through various international bodies, especially the UN. It it’s not just an edict issued by the state department. That’s not to say that the policy has been a resounding success. North Korea is still essentially a giant prison camp for its own population which suffers from the abuse and inept wielding of by the leadership in Pyongyang. However all out war or a collapse of the regime into chaos has been avoided, both scenarios potentially involving the displacement and loss of live of millions of people.

      With respect to US healthcare, employment and various other problems in the US, which certainly exist, it doesn’t follow that one must make one’s own country perfect before one can attend to the threats posed in the international community.

  2. I REQUEST TO SCRUTINIZE MYANMAR-NK MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. FIRST THING TO SEE IS SHWE MANN, WHO WENT TO NK AND HAD PURCHASED HUNDREDS OF MILLION DOLLARS ARMS AND MISSILES FOR MYANMAR.

  3. US and the West are naive enough to believe that Nay Pyi Taw will abandon N Korea. Current Myanmar government is the same government from Than Shwe’s reign. President and Hlutdaw are still under military.

  4. we should seriously consider about the photos of SHWE MANN and NORTH KOREAN GENERALS.
    Those photos are not the same way as WI KI LEAKS.
    We strongly believe that was Psycchological Warfare from Burmese Military.
    They arrested EX Army Major.

  5. Army Major still in the Prison is not WiKi Leak Julian Assange or Edward Snowden.
    He,s a victim.
    ARMY HMA CHA KYWE DAR KHAN LIKE YA DE.
    We are sorry for him and his family.

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