The Military’s Role in Asean Nations

Most of Southeast Asia has experienced military rule at some stage since the Colonial Era ended, and the political role of the region's military institutions has shaped and influenced politics right up to the present day.

The often-decisive interventions of the military in national politics have restricted the development of democracy, freedom of speech and human rights in many countries. In 2008, of the 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), only Indonesia was deemed a fully free country by the US-based Freedom House, an NGO that monitors democracy and human rights.

Implicitly, a behind-the-scenes power-brokering process played by powerful military elites in Southeast Asian countries is a key factor in inhibiting democratic development across the region.

At a September conference at the Institute for Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, these issues were among those discussed by scholars who examined civil-military relations in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

In the Southeast Asian region, Burma stands out, however, due to the sheer longevity of military rule and the entrenchment of the army in all sectors of society and the economy.

ISIS Director Thitinan Pongsudhirak remarked that in 1960, Burma was a democracy, having the highest GDP per capita in the region and with a relatively-advanced economy and noted education sector.

However, these days, the entrenchment of military rule is so thorough, it is more appropriate to use the term “military-civil relations,” according to Win Min. In a deep irony, the very military institution established by Burmese icon Aung San has kept its founder’s daughter and national democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 14 of the past 20 years, as part of its strategy to retain control of the country under a new constitution and elections scheduled for 2010.

The Napyidaw junta is regarded as introverted at best, and outright hostile to cosmopolitan or outside influences at worst, so it is debatable what lessons they have drawn from other countries in the region, which have either experienced military rule or felt the weight of the army bear down on day-to-day politics. There are both parallels and differences between the various cases that can perhaps shed some light on the nature of military rule in Burma.

Indonesia under Gen Suharto seems to be the closest comparison with contemporary Burma, even if optimism about present-day democratization across that vast archipelago does not have any Burmese parallel right now.

Like Burma, the Indonesian army played a central role in winning independence, which entrenched the military’s centrality and authority. Like Burma, Indonesia is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country—albeit on a vaster scale.

Fears among the military elites in both that peripheral or ethnic minority regions could secede were used to justify for an overweening military influence in both countries and ultimately a military coup in the case of Burma in 1962. In Indonesia, the army retained a dwifungsi (dual function) in both defense/security and government, between 1957, when democratic rule was discarded, and 1998, when the long era of Suhartos's military-backed authoritarianism ended amid chaos and near civil war.

Under Suharto, the military was given corporate representation in government and state-owned corporations. Each military branch has its own foundation, operating businesses in the financial sector, travel industry, manufacturing and resource extraction. Similarly, as Win Min outlines, the Burmese army monopolizes the economy through a crony system.

Two vast conglomerates predominate—the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC)—both of which have been led by active military officers. Most of the inward FDI is channeled through UMEH, and both entities are involved in a wide array of business across the full spectrum of the national economy.

Since 1998, the Indonesian military has relinquished its reserved seats in parliament and retreated from its dominance of politics in the archipelago, under pressure from a long-suppressed democratic movement.

While this does not mean that civilian control over the military has been asserted, it is a clear difference between Indonesia and Burma, where the 2008 constitution is geared toward giving the military effective control, under a civilian veneer, in a future Burma.

Under the new constitution, the proposed new military commander-in-chief will have greater authority than the president (who almost certainly will be a retired military officer in any case) in key areas.

Twenty-five percent of national members of parliament and 33 percent of regional MPs will be active military officers appointed by the military chief, and there is no plan to phase this out.