The ‘Balkanization’ of Burma?

Two studies draw a landscape of a fragmented country

Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, by Mary P. Callahan, Policy Studies 31, East-West Center, Washington, 2007, P 94; Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, by Zaw Oo and Win Min, Policy Studies 39, East-West Center, Washington, 2007, P 91.

IT has become fashionable to call up the specter of “balkanization” in Burma. The term, which means the fragmentation of large regions into smaller, violently competitive or antagonistic entities, as occurred in the Balkan wars of the late 19th century and in the breakup of Yugoslavia less than 20 years ago, also invokes images of ethnic cleansing and chaos.

Anyone with a grasp of history and geography knows that Burma has actually been fragmented for decades. A study of the map, a tally of the ethnic minorities of Burma and neighboring countries, and an understanding of the effects of 60 years of colonialism and of the following six decades of war—all confirm this conclusion.

For those not much interested in human development and human rights, things in Burma are in some ways better now than they ever were. As these two academic monographs by notable Burma experts contend, the country now is arguably at its most stable, peaceful, geographically united and developed juncture since 1948. That doesn’t mean things are good, however.

The study by Zaw Oo and Win Min provides an empirical overview of the ceasefires between the central government and dozens of ethnic militia armies, such as the Wa, Shan, Kachin and Mon. Mary Callahan’s theoretically grounded study complements the first by looking at the overlapping areas of authority in the hinterlands as a result of the post-1989 ceasefire agreements.

These arrangements, only one of which was a formal written and signed agreement (between the regime and the Kachin Independence Organization), were reached in three distinct phases, corresponding to differing needs of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc).

First, Slorc signed vague but empowering agreements for the Wa, Kokang and other former communist forces to stop fighting in exchange for business concessions, usually in narcotics. The second and third phases, during the 1990s, were agreements made more on Slorc terms, with the Kachin, Pa-O, Palaung and Mon agreeing to demands that have had mixed results.

The State Peace and Development Council which succeeded Slorc extended the reach of the military to permit such infrastructure development as road and bridge construction, but the lives of local people did not improve. The authors state that while human rights violations have decreased in some areas, they have increased in others, and the patchy arrangements “have not brought any political settlement to the decades-long ethnic conflict.”

Callahan argues that the process has produced three broad forms of government in border areas. The first of these, devolution, admits that non-state entities (such as warlords and resistance forces) control the area. The second, occupation, entails government forces establishing uncontested control over a patch of territory. The third, coexistence, involves the cooperation of state and non-state authorities (often uneasily) to control an area. This latter arrangement is hardly ideal, but it supports the contention of Zaw Oo and Win Min that a peace of sorts has been reached.

As Callahan observes: “The state lacks the capacity, resources, will, and expertise to truly advance society toward its proclaimed goals, but it nonetheless retains the unmistakable ability to reshape the lives of many throughout the country.”

Callahan describes this as a condition of “not-quite peace.” In some senses, the militarized archipelago of ceasefire zones constitutes a Burmese army regulated balkanization.

These two monographs, part of a series that includes Tom Kramer’s publication on the Wa army (reviewed by Bertil Lintner in The Irrawaddy’s December 2007 issue), are a commendable addition to international understanding of this complex conflict.

While the authors are sometimes vague on details, and Callahan is not specific on the identity of the “warlords” and “paramilitaries” who wield so much power in the hinterlands, the monographs benefit from interviews with officials from the armed groups and use of government documents.